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Frankfurt-School critical theory is hugely important. 
Critical theory challenges “traditional” theory’s fact/
value divide and the ensuing tendency to support the sta-
tus quo. Critical theorists prefer a broader perspective, 
with more emancipatory goals (Bohman 2019; Geuss 
1981, 1–2; Horkheimer 1972, 188–243).
Such views have been extremely influential—and not 
only among political theorists and political philosophers 
(e.g., Allen 2015; Benhabib 1986; Fraser 1985; Marasco 
2015). Critical theory is one of the nine major theoretical 
perspectives covered in The Oxford Handbook of 
International Relations (Reus-Smit and Snidal 2008) and 
underpins many empirical studies in that field (see Risse 
2015). Work on the public sphere by Jürgen Habermas, a 
key critical theorist, underlies theoretical work on civil 
society (e.g., Cohen and Arato 1992) and empirical work 
by political scientists (e.g., Wampler and Avritzer 2004). 
Critical theory is particularly important in deliberative 
democracy, both in theory (e.g., Dryzek 1990; Hammond 
2019; Rostbøll 2008) and underlying much empirical 
analysis (e.g., Steiner et al. 2004). So, critical theory is 
not just abstract: it is also widely applied in empirical 
research in politics. The same holds in other disciplines 
(Blau 2011, 40; 2019).
Critical theory is highly and increasingly diverse (Rush 
2004, 7), but the critique of instrumental rationality is 
“probably its most notable contribution” (Alford 2017, 
425). Instrumental rationality—roughly, the ability to 
choose good means to ends—is typically seen by critical 
theorists as amoral, narrow, or having damaging effects. 
Such concerns go back to predecessors of critical theory, 
including Kant, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Weber, and 
Lukács (Schecter 2010). And similar criticisms are made 
by many outside critical theory (e.g., in an economics 
textbook by Varoufakis 1998, 92–93, 100–101, 114, 
264–65, 356–58). Much of my response applies to such 
thinkers too. Of course, not all critical theorists discuss 
instrumental rationality, and those who do so sometimes 
offer different analyses (Smulewicz-Zucker 2017). But 
the critique is central for many critical theorists and 
informs many empirical studies as exemplified above.
My key argument is that this critique of instrumental 
rationality is overstated. Critical theorists can and should 
attack particular conceptions and applications of instru-
mental rationality. But instrumental rationality itself, 
properly understood, is a sensible idea. And it is one that 
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critical theorists actually need, for example, for delibera-
tive democracy.
But defending instrumental rationality requires some 
tweaks to standard accounts—my second aim. I apply 
some ideas not previously prominent in the literature, 
such as John Rawls’s surprising depiction of instrumental 
rationality as an essentially contested concept, and some 
ideas not previously related to instrumental rationality at 
all, such as Joseph Raz’s tripartite account of ends.
This paper thus strengthens instrumental rationality 
against criticisms. But the paper also strengthens critical 
theory. I do not oppose critical theory; indeed, I have 
offered some contributions myself (Blau, 2019). But the 
critique of instrumental rationality needs rewriting. 
Critical theorists can still attack narrow or immoral ends, 
inadequate questioning of those ends, and so on. But 
these are not problems with instrumental rationality itself.
This sounds like a fundamental challenge to a central 
concern of a prominent theoretical perspective. But instru-
mental rationality should never have been a central con-
cern in critical theory. Indeed, critical theorists themselves 
need instrumental rationality. Reframing the critique thus 
strengthens, not weakens, critical theory: focusing on 
what really matters makes the objections harder to ignore.
My paper builds on work by James Johnson and 
Joseph Heath. Each advocates closer links between 
Habermasian critical theory and rational choice theory, 
especially game theory. Johnson (1991, 1993) shows 
how Habermasian critical theory and rational choice 
theory illuminate each other, while Heath argues that 
rational choice theory strengthens Habermas’s accounts 
of communicative action (Heath 2001, chapters 2–4) and 
social order (Heath 1996, 51–59; 2001, chapters 6–7).
Nonetheless, my focus is different. I largely sidestep 
rational choice and game theory. Instrumental rationality 
should be part of any theory of action or morality, not just 
rational choice. Many scholars have an almost instinctive 
distrust of rational choice and game theory. Instrumental 
rationality should be less controversial: we need it to 
cross the road to buy a present for a friend to show our 
affection for them, say.
Moreover, Johnson and Heath primarily address 
Habermas. (Indeed Johnson, writing in the early 1990s, 
cannot address Habermas’s change of direction in 1993, as 
we will see). Habermas is not exactly positive about instru-
mental rationality, but he is less negative than many critical 
theorists. This paper thus covers Habermas and other criti-
cal theorists too.
I should add three important caveats. First, I am not 
defending instrumental rationality as the only idea of 
rationality, or even the main one; nor do prominent expo-
nents of instrumental rationality. Any complete theory of 
rationality will probably include instrumental rationality 
(Nozick 1993, 133, 176; Pauer-Studer 2007, 76, 79), but 
instrumental rationality is only one part of this broader 
value-system (Rawls 1971, 412–24; 1996, 50–51). 
Instrumental rationality does not exhaust rationality: at 
“the core of our rational capacity” is “the ability to engage 
in self-critical reflection” about our “standard of delibera-
tion” (Gauthier 1986, 183), and our ends ultimately mat-
ter more than our means (Rescher 1988, vii, 1–2, 6–8). 
Instrumental rationality can even be irrational: seeking 
means to ends which are based on palpably irrational 
beliefs is hardly the epitome of rationality (Elster 1983, 
15–26).
Second, my account of instrumental rationality is 
broader than that used by most economists and rational 
choice theorists, who often specify fixed ends, egoism, 
complete preferences, and so on. Economists have long 
known that such assumptions are false (e.g., Sen 1977) 
but usually need them for modeling, explaining, or pre-
dicting (Varoufakis 1998, 54). That said, rational choice 
theorists increasingly amend such assumptions (Fearon 
and Wendt 2002, 55–56), a point occasionally recognized 
by critical theorists (White 2004, 313).
Third, when I discuss “critical theorists,” I primarily 
mean first-generation and second-generation Frankfurt-
School critics of instrumental rationality (especially Max 
Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Jürgen Habermas), 
and, importantly, the huge number of “applied” scholars 
they have influenced, conducting empirical analysis of 
deliberative democracy, civil society, and so on. I largely 
sidestep more recent Frankfurt-School theorists. Writers 
like Rainer Först hardly address instrumental rationality. 
Axel Honneth, indeed, sees recognition as more funda-
mental than rationality (Honneth 2007), and as noted 
below, criticizes some caricatures of instrumental ratio-
nality. But such writers have fewer “applied” followers 
studying politics.
This paper runs as follows. After briefly summarizing 
and starting to challenge critical theorists’ account of 
instrumental rationality, I criticize five common fallacies 
in this critique. Nonetheless, the critique requires changes 
to orthodox depictions of instrumental rationality. I thus 
define instrumental rationality more broadly than is stan-
dard. I then use Rawls’s insight about instrumental ratio-
nality’s essential contestability, to deflect allegations that 
instrumental rationality necessarily implies efficiency, 
speed, or cost, say. I also discuss “second-order” instru-
mental rationality: the ability to choose good means to 
choosing means or ends, which Habermasian critical theo-
rists need. I then supplement a point made by others—that 
every end is a means to other ends—to reject the critical-
theory view that instrumental rationality is non-cognitive, 
that is, says nothing about our ends. I also challenge criti-
cal-theory objections about instrumental rationality’s 
amorality, by showing that because instrumental rational-
ity almost always involves multiple ends, one end may act 
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as a side-constraint, precluding immoral means. Overall, 
the more nuanced critique of instrumental rationality rec-
ommended here, although apparently undercutting a core 
commitment for many critical theorists, actually strength-
ens critical theory.
Critical-Theory Critiques of 
Instrumental Rationality: Overview
Frankfurt-School critical theory originated in the Institute 
for Social Research in Frankfurt in the 1920s. In 1937, 
Horkheimer (1972, 188–243) published his famous essay 
contrasting traditional and critical theory, but as regards 
instrumental rationality, the key early texts were pub-
lished in 1947: Horkheimer’s (2004) Eclipse of Reason, 
and Horkheimer and Adorno’s (1972) Dialectic of 
Enlightenment. Their excessive pessimism (see Schecter 
2010, 89, 223–24) led Habermas, from the 1970s 
onward, to offer more constructive accounts involving 
different ideas of rationality, primarily communicative 
and discursive rationality (especially Habermas 1979, 
1984, 1990). Habermas (1987b, 333) even criticizes the 
way that Horkheimer and Adorno “demonized” instru-
mental rationality.
Simplifying considerably, there are typically two 
stages to these criticisms of instrumental rationality, 
including those criticisms by adherents of Horkheimer, 
Adorno, and Habermas. Stage 1 makes conceptual and/or 
empirical claims: critical theorists define instrumental 
rationality, note its presuppositions, and/or describe its 
effects. Stage 2 negatively evaluates what stage 1 depicted 
and, except in Horkheimer and Adorno’s pessimistic 
accounts, adds prescriptions, for example, restricting 
instrumental rationality or recommending alternatives.
I will suggest that stage 1 depictions of instrumental 
rationality are too narrow: instrumental rationality in gen-
eral is conflated with particular conceptions or applica-
tions of it. This encourages stage 2 criticisms that attack 
instrumental rationality in general rather than particular 
conceptions or applications.
Before elaborating, I should address one potential 
objection: that critical theorists are not actually attacking 
instrumental rationality in general, only some applica-
tions. As Fred Rush notes, we all use instrumental ratio-
nality, for example, deciding how to get to the cinema to 
see a movie that one wants to compare with another 
movie. So, “there does not seem to be anything particu-
larly suspicious about ‘instrumental reason’ understood 
in this manner, although of course one may doubt its 
application in specific contexts.” Critical theorists “do 
not begrudge rational agents their means and, so, are not 
‘against’ instrumental reason in these broad terms” (Rush 
2013, 192).
Unfortunately—and this matters greatly for my 
paper—there is little textual evidence for this position 
(one exception being Honneth and Joas, discussed 
shortly). To the contrary: there is ample evidence that 
many critical theorists, although doubtless not all, are 
attacking instrumental rationality in general. For exam-
ple, Horkheimer, arguably the most influential of early 
critical theorists (Rush 2004, 7), clearly criticizes instru-
mental rationality in general: “the optimum adaptation of 
means to ends.” And note how he immediately depicts 
this as “a pragmatic instrument oriented to expediency, 
cold and sober” (Horkheimer 1941, 368, emphasis 
added). Yet, instrumental rationality can also be warm 
and merry, used for planning parties, finding friends, 
deciding which charities to support, showing apprecia-
tion of kind acts by loved ones, and so on. Portraying 
instrumental rationality as “cold and sober” lets 
Horkheimer (1941, 368) link instrumental rationality—
which he defines broadly, I reiterate—to “the modern 
technique of war,” “the conduct of business,” and “the 
dictators of today.” But instrumental rationality can 
equally be used by pacifists, socialists, and liberals.
Elsewhere, Horkheimer (2004, 5) depicts instrumental 
rationality as devoted
exclusively to the relation of . . . an object or concept to a 
purpose, not to the object or concept itself. There is no 
reasonable aim as such, and to discuss the superiority of one 
aim over another in terms of reason becomes meaningless.
This is clearly instrumental rationality in general. Yet, he 
links this to self-preservation and self-interest (Horkheimer 
2004, 5). That claim is self-defeating: if instrumental 
rationality has “no reasonable aim as such,” then it need 
not involve self-interest and self-preservation.
Habermas (1979, 41, 117; 1984, 285–86; 1996, 25, 27, 
90, 161, 337), too, repeatedly claims that instrumental 
rationality and its social variant strategic rationality are 
egocentric. Habermas never justifies this assertion, nor 
can he (Blau 2019; Johnson 1991, 189–91; see also 
Honneth and Joas’s critique of Habermas, discussed in 
Deranty 2009, 173–77).
Many other critical theorists, similarly, depict instru-
mental rationality in terms of choosing means to ends, 
then criticize particular versions or applications of this 
(e.g., Benhabib 1986, 183; Gardiner 2000, 83, 89; Healey 
1997, 9, 23–29; Murray 2018, 771–73; Schecter 2010, 
10, 15, 19, 22, 167–68, 224; Smulewicz-Zucker 2017, 
187. On Adorno, see Finlayson 2002, 3: “Adorno is sus-
picious of instrumental rationality per se”).
In short, many critical theorists do seem to conflate 
instrumental rationality in general with particular notions 
or applications of it, without explicitly distinguishing the 
two scopes or stating that they are only criticizing the 
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latter—let alone noting that the former is perfectly defen-
sible, at least sometimes. Rush’s defense of critical theo-
rists does not seem to apply as widely as he suggests.
Stage 1 of the Critique of 
Instrumental Rationality
I now offer more detail on the two stages of critical theo-
rists’ attack on instrumental rationality. In stage 1 (con-
ceptual and/or empirical), instrumental rationality is 
defined, its presuppositions are noted, and/or its effects 
are described. Here, instrumental rationality is typically 
depicted too narrowly, even where critical theorists start 
with a broader notion, as just discussed. Thus, we are 
told that—in terms of definitions, presuppositions, or 
effects—instrumental rationality involves dominating 
nature (Horkheimer 2004, 64), the predominance of sci-
ence and technology (Marcuse 1991, 157–63), abstract 
reason and mind/body dualism (Gardiner 2000, 9), 
bureaucracy (Dryzek 1990, 4–5), treating other people 
merely as a means (Alker 1990, 174), and conservatism 
(Dryzek 2006, 113). These linkages may overlap, as 
when Michael Ott relates instrumental rationality to 
atomism, bourgeois egoism, neoliberalism, capitalism, 
class domination, colonialism, imperialism, and a sub-
ject–object dualism where subjects try to control and 
manipulate an objectified world (Ott 2006, 121–23), or 
when Patrick Murray (2018, 769) states that instrumen-
tal rationality “presupposes a world stripped of social 
forms and purposes, devoid of moral, aesthetic, gen-
dered, social, legal, and political features—a world with-
out a way of life.”
This very last claim—instrumental rationality presup-
posing a world with no way of life—is theoretically 
impossible. Instrumental rationality is about picking 
means to ends. Without a way of life, without ends, we 
cannot pick means to them; we cannot be instrumentally 
rational. This is important. What instrumental rationality 
actually presupposes is a value-system, otherwise one 
has no ends to pick means to. Instrumental rationality 
will be dangerous in a bad value-system, and desirable in 
a good one.
But the other claims mentioned above are all theoreti-
cally possible, and different critical theorists emphasize 
different ones. Some criticisms are legitimate: instrumental 
rationality’s adherents regularly ignore gender, for exam-
ple (Healey 1996, 220), and most assume self-interest, 
although again this is not a necessary assumption (Brennan 
and Hamlin 2000, 6–10; Hausman 2007, 53; Pauer-Studer 
2007, 77, 79–80).
The substance of critical theorists’ claims thus matters 
hugely, and many adherents of instrumental rationality 
overlook these problems. But I think that only two of the 
above links are potentially inherent to instrumental ratio-
nality: the assumption of fixed, pre-given ends (e.g., 
Habermas 1984, 170–72; Horkheimer and Adorno 1972, 
36–42), and amorality, such that instrumental rationality 
can be applied to murderous ends (Forester 1985, 49; 
Weizenbaum 1976, 252, 256). I address these challenges 
toward the end of the paper.
Those two possibilities aside, none of the above claims 
necessarily follows from seeking good means to ends. 
Consider again Horkheimer’s (1941, 370; 2004, 3; see 
too 69) claim that in instrumental rationality, the ends 
“serve the subject’s interest in relation to self-preserva-
tion.” This is not a necessary relationship. As Horkheimer 
knew, kamikaze pilots can pick good means to their (lit-
eral) end. Similarly, we can pick means to environmental 
flourishing, rather than just dominating nature; we can 
pick means to feminist ends, rather than patriarchal ones; 
we can pick means to socialist ends, not just neoliberal 
ones.
Such overstated criticisms thus involve a “type/token 
fallacy,” conflating instrumental rationality in general 
with particular examples of it, or what I call “rotten-
cherry-picking”: instead of defending something by 
cherry-picking good examples of it, one attacks some-
thing by only picking bad examples of it. In short, most 
depictions of instrumental rationality by critical theorists 
only fit particular notions or applications of it.
Stage 2 of the Critique of 
Instrumental Rationality
I now turn from narrow depictions of instrumental ratio-
nality at stage 1 to stage 2: negative evaluations of instru-
mental rationality and, usually, prescriptions about 
removing or supplementing it. A common fallacy here is 
what I call “the out-of-tune violin fallacy.” If we hear 
someone playing a violin out of tune, we do not criticize 
the violin, because we know it can be played well. Nearly 
all of the critical theorists mentioned in the previous sec-
tion move from the type/token fallacy just mentioned to 
the out-of-tune violin fallacy, criticizing instrumental 
rationality in general due to particular examples of it.
Another stage 2 fallacy is what I call “the nothing-
but-carrots fallacy.” If someone dies after eating nothing 
but carrots, it is fallacious to criticize carrots. We can 
legitimately criticize someone who tries to live by instru-
mental rationality alone, but we should not criticize 
instrumental rationality—because instrumental rational-
ity, within a broader framework of morality and rational-
ity, is desirable.
Yet, critical theorists often attack a world reduced to 
instrumental rationality as if instrumental rationality is the 
problem. Thus, Joseph Weizenbaum (1976, 252), drawing 
on Horkheimer, describes it as “entirely reasonable” to use 
B52s and napalm to get what you want “if ‘reason’ means 
instrumental reason.” But this is only right if reason means 
instrumental reason alone. Incorporating other kinds of 
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reason may preclude napalm and B52s. Instrumental 
rationality should be praised when it makes useful contri-
butions to broader accounts of reason.
Likewise, as noted above, Murray (2018, 769) claims 
that instrumental rationality “presupposes a world stripped 
of social forms and purposes, devoid of moral, aesthetic, 
gendered, social, legal, and political features—a world 
without a way of life.” Murray’s criticism is fallacious 
in several respects—I mention another shortly—but here 
the problem is that Murray is attacking a purely instru-
mental world. A world composed solely of blue things 
would be unpleasantly monotonous, but we would not 
criticize the color blue.
Consider too Horkheimer’s (2004, 69) criticism of the 
“complete transformation of the world into a world of 
means rather than of ends.” Habermas (1987a, 112; see 
also 113–14) later censured Adorno and Horkheimer for 
the way they “oversimplify [their] image of modernity so 
astoundingly.” But even if Adorno and Horkheimer’s 
gloomy assertion were empirically correct, the normative 
evaluation is flawed. The problem is not instrumental 
rationality but the failure to supplement instrumental 
rationality with more substantive kinds of rationality.
A third stage 2 fallacy is what I will call “the poisoned 
carrots fallacy.” If someone dies from a poisoned carrot, 
we criticize the poison, not the carrot. Criticizing the car-
rot is similar to critical theorists attacking Nazis and oth-
ers who seek instrumentally rational means to evil ends. 
The problem here is evil ends, not instrumental rational-
ity. After all, we do not criticize those who seek instru-
mentally rational means to charitable or altruistic ends.
Thus, when Weizenbaum (1976, 256) depicts the 
Holocaust as “a textbook exercise in instrumental rea-
son,” the problem was not instrumental rationality but 
Nazi morality. The Nazis’s opponents also used instru-
mental rationality, but for better ends. True, some Nazis 
failed to question their ends, asking only how to reach 
those ends. But many opponents of fascism simply asked 
how to reach their non-fascist ends. The morality of the 
ends matters most.
So, it cannot be right that “[c]apitalism radicalizes 
guilt because its morality is simply identical with the 
means/ends rationality of modern instrumental thinking” 
(Ross 2017, 362). Critical theorists cannot hold both that 
instrumental rationality is about finding means to ends, 
whatever those ends are, and that instrumental rationality 
is about finding means to capitalist ends. By contrast, 
Honneth (2007, 82, emphasis added) gets the emphasis 
right in describing “capitalist instrumentalization,” not 
instrumentalization per se.
However, the most damaging fallacy at stage 2 of the 
critique of instrumental rationality is a version of “the 
false dilemma fallacy,” which oversimplifies choices 
(e.g., “you are either with us or you are with the terror-
ists”). Here, the implication is that we must choose 
instrumental rationality or something else. Denouncing 
instrumental rationality thus prompts readers to reject it.
One response is that instrumental rationality might be 
less problematic, perhaps even desirable, if combined with 
other kinds of rationality. If asked to pick P or Q, we might 
pick both. I endorse this response later. Another response, 
consistent with this, is to reject only narrow forms of 
instrumental rationality, not instrumental rationality in 
general. When critical theorists start with instrumental 
rationality as picking means to ends, and then attack patho-
logical forms of this—capitalist ends, patriarchy, and so 
on—they leave space for forms of instrumental rationality 
that do not involve such pathologies. If asked to pick P or 
Q, we might ask if there are alternatives. There definitely 
are alternatives to the caricatures of instrumental rational-
ity presented by many critical theorists.
The false dilemma fallacy is very common. For exam-
ple, Gardiner (2000, 7, 38, 85, 90, 96, 134, 148–51) several 
times contrasts instrumental or “purely” instrumental 
approaches with “non-instrumental” approaches, as if 
there is no middle ground (see likewise Benhabib 1986, 
224, though not 137–38). The false dilemma fallacy is 
particularly common among Habermas’s followers. 
Habermas (1984, 10–12, 86–88, 285–86) disparages 
instrumental rationality (and its social counterpart, strate-
gic rationality) and defends communicative rationality 
(and its subset, discursive rationality, the rationality of dis-
course ethics). We might note in passing that Habermas has 
a decidedly imperfect understanding of instrumental ratio-
nality, rational choice theory, and game theory (Heath 
1995, 225–28; 2001, 4; Johnson 1991, 189–91, 199), and 
that Habermas’s response to Johnson (1991) misses the 
point (Habermas 1996, 554). But for here, the problem is 
that Habermas’s followers sometimes present this as a 
choice between instrumental and communicative rational-
ity (e.g., Dryzek 1993, 214, though not Dryzek 1992, 408–
409; Forester 1985, 49–51, though not Forester 1993, 25).
Instrumental rationality but only in restricted situations. 
John Dryzek (1990, 14; see also 9, 218; 1994, 169), for 
example, sees instrumental rationality as “often unavoid-
able,” but wants to keep it in “a subordinate domain.”
Yet all critical theorists need instrumental rationality, 
in their daily lives and for their political projects. We 
could not eat or travel without instrumental rationality. 
We could not even communicate: we constantly make 
choices about how to communicate our ideas, for exam-
ple, whether a personal anecdote is a good way of mak-
ing a general point. Habermas (1979, 68) implies the 
same: speech is “a medium in which . . . linguistic means 
. . . are employed instrumentally” (see too Johnson’s 
1993 critique of Habermas, which shows how game the-
ory informs communicative agreement). Unfortunately, 
as discussed above, there is ample textual evidence that 
many critical theorists oppose instrumental rationality as 
a whole.
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In 1993, Habermas (1993, 1–17) changed tack, implic-
itly accepting instrumental rationality in his account of 
pragmatic reason. Unfortunately, Habermasian critical 
theorists applying his ideas to deliberative democracy 
and suchlike mostly address his 1980s work on commu-
nicative action, which was more hostile to instrumental 
rationality (Blau, 2019).
Instrumental rationality is even needed in Habermasian 
discursive rationality, although to my knowledge critical 
theorists do not say so explicitly. As William Rehg (1994, 
46–49) and Simone Chambers (1996, 90–91) note, dis-
cursive reason must consider knock-on consequences. In 
Rehg’s example, capitalist exchange may seem legitimate 
to participants in a discourse until they consider the con-
sequences. Consider Nozick’s claim that it seems reason-
able to freely pay money to watch a sports star, if that star 
ends up richer, fair enough—literally. But Habermas’s 
(1990, 65) universalization principle, central to discourse 
ethics, asks if all affected by a norm accept its conse-
quences and side-effects. Are Nozickean capitalist 
exchanges good means to a desirable kind of society? 
Might inequality have undesirable effects on health and 
education, say?
So, instrumental rationality plays some part in 
Habermasian communicative and discursive rationality 
(see too Blau, 2019). Instrumental rationality should not 
be restricted to certain domains. Rather, it should be 
restricted in terms of how much it controls, by placing it 
in a broader theory of rationality and morality, whether 
Habermasian or not.
Instrumental rationality is a bit like a carrot which 
contributes to our health, as long as we can eat more than 
just carrots, and as long as it is not poisoned. It is like a 
violin that can be played in tune or out of tune; we should 
criticize the latter, but might want the former. And we do 
not face a choice between instrumental rationality and 
other kinds of rationality.
In short, critical theorists make important criticisms of 
instrumental rationality, but these criticisms are mostly 
too strong. More nuanced criticisms help critical theo-
rists see the value, not just the dangers, of instrumental 
rationality.
Instrumental Rationality: Responding 
to Critical Theorists
These criticisms of instrumental rationality by many 
critical theorists are too strong but still have much 
power. Particularly important are two claims: instru-
mental rationality involves fixed ends, precluding the 
questioning of ends; and instrumental rationality is 
amoral, permitting immoral actions. Moreover, instru-
mental rationality’s adherents do often depict it in ego-
centric, economistic ways.
I thus offer an account of instrumental rationality to 
avert these objections. My account will, I hope, be 
broadly palatable both to traditional defenders of instru-
mental rationality—my position is broadly orthodox, 
despite these tweaks—and to critical theorists too.
I start by defining instrumental rationality as the abil-
ity to choose good means to ends. An agent (individual or 
collective) is instrumentally rational to the extent that it 
can choose optimal means to ends. Instrumental rational-
ity is a matter of degree (Kolodny and Brunero 2016, sec-
tion 1), although I usually talk dichotomously, for ease of 
expression.
An “agent” can be an individual or a group, for exam-
ple, a family. “Ability” means the faculty or faculties by 
which agents reach decisions. These faculties need not 
include “reason”: instinctively fleeing from a snake may 
be instrumentally rational (see, similarly, Rawls 1971, 
423). Instrumental rationality and emotion are perfectly 
consistent (Gilboa 2010, 139–42). Emotions provide 
ends on which instrumentally rational individuals act, for 
example, love of children (Gilboa 2010, 139), and can be 
heuristic shortcuts to instrumentally rational actions 
(Nussbaum 2001, 106–109). Rational decisions can even 
be subconscious (Becker 1976, 7).
This fits the Habermasian (1984, 9, 11, 15, 17, 22, 
115–16; 1996, 119–20) understanding of reason and 
rationality as the ability to give reasons or good reasons. 
This idea must include giving reasons counterfactually. 
When I make instrumentally rational decisions, for 
example crossing a road, I could have explained my 
choice, even when I actually do not. This counterfactual 
view of rationality must also apply in Habermasian com-
municative rationality. The validity-claims inherent in 
communicative rationality are usually tacit: we typically 
understand and agree with each other’s propositions 
without interrogating them. But if we do question a prop-
osition, reasons would have to be given for the communi-
cative understanding and agreement to be rational (see, 
for example, Habermas 1979, 1–5; 1996, 4).
So, instrumental rationality does not necessarily 
involve the cold, calculating, conscious, cost/benefit 
computations described by many critics. Nor have I 
assumed fixed or given ends, as I explain later, or self-
interest, as noted above. And permitting agents to be 
collective avoids implying anything individualistic, 
let alone that instrumental rationality opposes commu-
nicative or discursive decision-making.
The Essential Contestability of 
Instrumental Rationality
The next step in deflecting critical-theory critiques of 
instrumental rationality is more surprising: highlighting 
instrumental rationality’s essential contestability. In an 
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important and oft-overlooked discussion, Rawls (1971, 
411–12) notes that “good” means can mean different 
things, for example, the most efficient means (such as 
speed or cost), the likeliest means for reaching a goal, and 
the means giving the greatest degree of a goal. The fastest 
means may not be the cheapest; the likeliest way of reach-
ing a goal may not provide as much of the goal as some-
thing riskier. Reasonable people may thus disagree about 
which option is best.
This is philosophically profound and extremely impor-
tant. It shows the paucity of many economics textbooks’ 
accounts of instrumental rationality, as criticized by Yanis 
Varoufakis in the academic stage of his career (see above). 
Even within economistic frameworks, deciding what is 
instrumentally rational may involve trade-offs and indif-
ference curves.
Emphasizing essential contestability also refutes any 
implication by critical theorists that instrumental ratio-
nality requires the quickest or cheapest means, say. For 
example, Werner Bonefeld (2014, 206) states that instru-
mental rationality “is interested in essentially two things: 
‘how long did it take?’ and ‘how much did it cost?’” This 
is true for some instrumental rationalists but not all. 
Critical theorists themselves can use instrumental ratio-
nality to ask “how many people can we emancipate, and 
how should we do this?” for example. Quite simply, 
instrumental rationality itself is unable to indicate what a 
“good” means to an end is.
Zygmunt Bauman (1989, 18), influenced by Adorno, 
voices an important concern: “there is nothing in those 
rules [of instrumental rationality] which disqualifies the 
Holocaust-style methods of ‘social-engineering.’” This 
commits the poisoned carrots fallacy—Bauman’s funda-
mental concern was Nazi ends, not instrumental rational-
ity. But the key issue here is that “the rules of instrumental 
rationality” say little to guide our choice of means either. 
If Nazis want to kill Jews, gays, and Communists, instru-
mental rationality itself does not say whether the best 
means are deaths which are fast or slow, cheap or expen-
sive, painless or painful, or public or private. I return to 
this later, but even normal value-systems will see multi-
ple candidates for “good” means to ends. It is these 
broader value-systems which clarify instrumental ratio-
nality by indicating what “good” means require. Critical 
theorists who think instrumental rationality requires 
cheap or quick means are usually assuming capitalist 




I now extend the basic idea of instrumental rationality, to 
deflect claims that instrumental rationality should be kept 
in a subordinate domain, for example, instrumental ratio-
nality as the rationality of bureaucracy, with communica-
tive rationality as the rationality of democracy (Dryzek 
1990, 4–5, 14–22; but see Blau 2011, 41–42, 50–54). My 
argument further accentuates instrumental rationality’s 
importance for critical theorists.
I thus introduce what I call “second-order instrumental 
rationality”: the ability to pick good means to picking 
means (or ends). If Aliya wants to get to London, second-
order instrumental rationality lets her choose a good way 
of picking the means—checking the Internet, asking 
friends, tossing a coin, and so on.
Second-order instrumental rationality helps 
Habermasian critical theorists who support deliberative 
democracy. Consider Innes and Booher’s (1999) fascinat-
ing Habermasian study which shows how role-playing 
games foster empathy, helping participants with conflict-
ing interests debate problems open-mindedly. This exem-
plifies second-order instrumental rationality, helping 
Habermasians implement deliberative democracy. Innes 
and Booher almost admit this. They condemn “the ratio-
nal, instrumental model of seeking means to reach a given 
end”: where “the ends are not clearly known at the out-
set,” we need “nonlinear, holistic” methods of decision-
making (Innes and Booher 1999, 15–16). But this 
implicitly accepts nonlinear, holistic methods as the best 
means for making decisions. Interestingly, in a passing 
comment, Habermas (1993, 3) accepts something simi-
lar: sometimes, “decision-making strategies themselves 
must be developed.”
Second-order instrumental rationality, while only a 
minor development of the standard idea, thus highlights 
instrumental rationality’s place in a broader theory of 
rationality and morality—even for critical theorists.
Ends as Means: The Cognitive Value 
of Instrumental Rationality
I now offer a more important contribution, to tackle criti-
cal-theory objections that instrumental rationality says 
nothing about ends. Recall that many critical theorists, 
quite understandably, define instrumental rationality as 
picking means to pre-given, fixed ends (e.g., Habermas 
1984, 170–72; Horkheimer and Adorno 1972, 36–42). 
This seems obviously right: after all, instrumental ratio-
nality is the ability to pick good means to ends, not the 
ability to pick good ends.
However, because everything has knock-on conse-
quences (e.g., cookies may cause health problems), instru-
mental rationality can help us reflect on and maybe pick 
different ends, by showing how a means or an end might 
affect other things we value.
Writers from diverse viewpoints have noted this 
before, including Habermas, as I will shortly discuss. 
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But such comments are mostly quite brief, and critics of 
instrumental rationality typically overlook this, regularly 
lambasting instrumental rationality as solely about 
means, not ends (e.g., Forester 1993, 49; Horkheimer 
2004, 3–4; Tribe 1973, 641, 648). They claim that 
“instrumental rationality cannot address the issue of 
desirable goals and norms” (Forester 1993, 49, emphasis 
added), that instrumental methods “simply cannot 
address the question of what one’s ultimate ends and val-
ues ought to be” (Tribe 1973, 641, emphasis added). 
(Tribe’s critique of instrumental rationality derives from 
Horkheimer: see Tribe 1974.)
Dryzek articulates this critique most powerfully. 
Instrumental rationality is “non-cognitive,” that is, values 
and preferences are “like emotions, beyond the reach of 
rational argument” (Dryzek 1992, 406), and are thus 
“given, formed independently of and before the choice at 
hand” (Dryzek 1996, 406). Yet political actors should be 
“subjecting their preferences to rational scrutiny and pos-
sible adjustment in the interests of determinate collective 
choices” (Dryzek 1992, 406). This is absolutely right: we 
need rational ways of discussing and picking ends. 
Dryzek (1990) was advocating deliberative democracy 
even before Habermas. Actual democracies, however, are 
systematically biased against open-minded deliberation, 
with citizens and politicians acting on existing prefer-
ences rather than deliberating and transforming their 
ideas: we need a more “reflexive” rationality, not instru-
mental rationality, to question ends rationally (Dryzek 
2006, 84–85, 111–23).
I support these comments, especially Dryzek’s percep-
tiveness about modern democracy’s bias against open-
mindedness, a Habermasian insight expressed more 
incisively than Habermas himself achieves. Nonetheless, 
these insights do not damage instrumental rationality.
I argue this first by applying Joseph Raz’s distinc-
tion between different kinds of intrinsic value, which to 
my knowledge has not been used in discussions of 
rationality. I then highlight the ambiguity of the term 
“given” ends. After showing that other writers accept 
my position—including, sometimes, Habermas him-
self—I reiterate that critical theorists need instrumental 
rationality.
In The Morality of Freedom, Raz distinguishes 
between three kinds of intrinsic value: (1) something 
which is of ultimate value, (2) something which is good 
in itself but not of ultimate value, and (3) something 
which is a constituent element of one of the first two 
kinds of value (Raz 1986, 200–201).
Consider J. S. Mill’s account of utility and liberty. 
Utility in the broad sense is of ultimate value. Liberty is 
good in itself: a freely chosen way of life is good even if 
utility does not result. Liberty is also a constituent ele-
ment of utility: a life of genuine utility must be freely 
chosen, not coerced. Finally, liberty is also instrumental 
to utility: giving people freedom makes utility likelier.
Other things are good in themselves and constitutive 
goods, of course, and many things will be instrumental 
goods. “Ends” are often simply means to other ends. We 
have “long chains of instrumental desires,” ultimately 
aimed at something valued in itself, but in practice often 
aimed simply at (intermediate) instrumental ends (Parfit 
2011, 44). Getting to the other side was presumably not 
the chicken’s ultimate goal.
It may thus be instrumentally irrational to pursue an 
end without considering other ends, in case the first end 
undermines more important ends. This is clearly the view 
of Hobbes and Bentham (Bentham 1996, 1.1, 11; 2.7, 19; 
7.5–7.6, 75; Hobbes 1991a, 6.57, 46; 18.20, 129; 1991b, 
11.5, 48; 12.1, 55; 1998, 3.31–3.32, 55–56). Yet, both 
authors, ironically, are often seen as pivotal in developing 
economistic instrumental rationality (e.g., Varoufakis 
1998, 78–84).
Instrumental rationality’s cognitivism may even 
inform deeply held values. Hobbes and Bentham want us 
to reflect on what really matters to us. Unlike homo eco-
nomicus, writes David Schmidtz (1994, 251), “[w]e 
sometimes stop to wonder whether an end like maximiz-
ing profit is worth having.” Instrumental rationality thus 
helps us “be rational in a more reflective sense, calling 
into question ends we happen to have, revising them 
when they seem unfit” (Schmidtz 1994, 227, emphasis 
removed). As Philip Pettit (2006, 142) notes, we can 
“interrogate” a goal “in the light of other goals that also 
appeal to us.” Even those who think “justice should be 
done though the heavens fall” may worry if a just act 
would cause billions of deaths (Thomson 1990, 167).
This explains Horkheimer’s error in discussing a judge 
in a traffic court, bound by instrumental rationality to con-
sider only whether a driver’s actions fit the law, respect 
life and property, and so on. The traffic judge “implicitly 
assumes that these values must be respected,” complains 
Horkheimer (2004, 7). But the system would collapse if 
traffic judges started questioning core values, say. Higher 
level judges do sometimes ask such questions, though, 
and instrumental rationality can help here, by asking if a 
law has highly undesirable consequences. In both cases, 
instrumental rationality helps us question values.
The ambiguous term “given” helps explain why instru-
mental rationality is unfairly criticized as non-cognitive. 
“Given” could simply mean “assuming” (e.g., “given 
assumption P, we should do Q”) or “fixed/unchangeable” 
(as in “condition X is a given: we can’t change it”). Critics 
like Tribe and Forester imply the second sense, but only 
the first sense is required. As Amartya Sen (2002, 310) 
writes, depicting preferences as given “does not amount 
to taking individual preferences . . . to be unchanging or 
unalterable.”
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So, Raz’s typology shows that we can value something 
both instrumentally and non-instrumentally. Critical the-
orists tend to talk more dichotomously (an exception 
being Finlayson 2002, 17, on knowledge as both intrinsi-
cally and instrumentally valuable). Ends have knock-on 
consequences and may even clash. When they do clash, 
instrumental rationality does not tell us which to pick, 
without a higher end like utility or peace. But thinking 
through the consequences of what we value can help us 
choose. This is one reason why deontologists are “crazy” 
to ignore consequences (Rawls 1971, 30).
Many writers make similar points. Nozick (1993, 
139), who initially states that “instrumental rationality 
gives us no way to evaluate the rationality of [one’s] 
goals,” adds “except as instrumentally effective in 
achieving further goals taken as given.” That, of course, 
is often the case. Herbert Simon (1983, 7–8, 11) described 
reason as “a gun for hire” which “cannot tell us where to 
go; at best it can tell us how to get there,” but adds that 
because these ends may have further consequences, 
instrumental rationality may help us see whether these 
intermediate ends are suitable means to our broader 
objectives—again, a frequent occurrence. Talcott Parsons 
(1949, 58, 229–30) expands on this: any such “chain” 
may intersect with other chains, leading to a “compli-
cated web” of “means-end relationships.”
Even Horkheimer spots this. Above, I quoted his view 
that instrumental rationality makes it “meaningless” to 
assess “the superiority of one aim over another in terms of 
reason.” The quotation continues: “such a discussion is 
possible [in instrumental rationality] only if both aims 
serve a third and higher one, that is, if they are means, not 
ends” (Horkheimer 2004, 5). But most ends are means in 
this respect! This is extremely common and thus extremely 
important.
Interestingly, some critical theorists’ understanding of 
this aspect of instrumental rationality may have been ham-
pered by a misunderstanding/mistranslation of Max Weber. 
For Weber (1968, 26), purposive rationality (zweckra-
tionalität) includes “the relations of the end to the second-
ary consequences.” Weber’s position is worth clarifying, 
because Roth and Wittich’s edition unhelpfully translates 
zweckrational not as “purposive” or “goal” rational but 
“instrumentally” rational. Instrumental and purposive 
rationality are usually equated for Weber, both by adher-
ents of instrumental rationality (e.g., Elster 2000, 31) and 
critical theorists (e.g., Benhabib 1986, 183; Murray 2018, 
769; Smulewicz-Zucker 2017, 187). This fosters anachro-
nistic readings of Weber (e.g., Elster 2000, 31, 35–36). But 
the full quotation, which is worth perusing carefully, states 
that actions are purposively rational when
the end, the means, and the secondary results are all 
rationally taken into account and weighed. This involves 
rational consideration of alternative means to the end, of the 
relations of the end to the secondary consequences, and 
finally of the relative importance of different possible ends. 
(Weber 1968, 26)
In other words, Weber’s purposive rationality has three 
components: (1) what we now call instrumental ratio-
nality; (2) consideration of knock-on consequences, 
which I argued above can be included in instrumental 
rationality; and (3) consideration of the relative impor-
tance of different ends—which is not part of instrumental 
rationality as most people conceive it. In short, Weber’s 
purposive rationality involves more than instrumental 
rationality.
For here, though, the key point is that even for Weber, 
purposive rationality includes considering consequences. 
This is repeatedly accepted by Habermas (1984, 170; 
1987b, 172, 285; 1993, 2–3, 10–11, 63; 1996, 159–61, 
180, 186–88), and instrumental reasoning even applies in 
Habermasian discourse ethics, as discussed above.
I am not saying that considering consequences neces-
sarily entails instrumental rationality, of course. A school 
student does not use instrumental rationality when asking 
if mitosis involves cells splitting into two or three, say. 
But instrumental rationality is entailed when considering 
consequences is part of considering whether an action is 
a good means to an end.
Instrumental rationality thus has some cognitive con-
tent: ends, values, and preferences are rationally assess-
able in terms of whether they are good means to other 
ends, to some extent. My overall position is hardly origi-
nal, but my use of Raz, my discussion of the ambiguity of 
“given” ends, and my exposure of a common misreading 
of Weber support an important point not always recog-
nized by adherents of instrumental rationality—and very 
rarely by critical theorists.
Ends as Goals and Criteria
Finally, I challenge the crucial argument that instrumental 
rationality is amoral, in that any means will do—whether 
those means are moral or immoral—if they facilitate our 
ends (e.g., Forester 1985, 49; Weizenbaum 1976, 252, 
256). My defense partly involves reiterating prior argu-
ments, but I also show that instrumental rationality itself 
can help deflect some immoral actions.
(Again, I am not questioning the substance of critical 
theorists’ objections. Ruthlessly capitalistic ends, for 
example, regularly lead to abhorrent actions. But as the 
poisoned carrots fallacy suggests, the fundamental 
problem here is ruthless capitalism, not instrumental 
rationality).
Although instrumental rationality is mostly depicted 
as the ability to choose good means to an end, we always 
10 Political Research Quarterly 00(0)
pursue multiple ends, because any end, even an ultimate 
end, has knock-on consequences. This is one reason why 
I earlier defined instrumental rationality in terms of good 
means to ends, plural.
This opens the door to instrumental rationality poten-
tially precluding immoral actions. Consider this example, 
heavily adapted from Habermas (1993, 2). Jenny nor-
mally cycles to work. One morning her bicycle breaks. 
She has five options: (1) fix the bicycle, (2) walk to work, 
(3) stay home, (4) use her old and highly polluting car, or 
(5) steal a bicycle.
Assume that option 1 does not work and option 2 
would take too long. Option 3, staying at home, high-
lights the previous section’s point that instrumental ratio-
nality need not assume fixed ends: here, the end of getting 
to work is (temporarily) dropped. Some people would 
preclude option 4: environmental protection disqualifies 
some means and ends. Likewise, most of us would never 
consider option 5. Even if stealing a bicycle flitted across 
our minds, we would probably reject it instinctively: it is, 
almost literally, “not an option.” Environmental protec-
tion and respecting property are thus ends which act like 
side-constraints on some people’s choices.
Remember that we have multiple ends (see Brennan 
2007, 118–19; Sen 1987, 81). I will thus distinguish 
between two kinds of end: “goals” and “criteria.” Jenny’s 
goal here is getting to work; the criteria are time, cost, 
respecting the environment, respecting property, and so 
on. Earlier, I noted the ambiguity of “good means” 
(Rawls 1971, 411–12): even narrow, amoral instrumental 
rationalists will almost always have more than one crite-
rion. Most people also have moral values, and some are 
side-constraints on our means. As Sen (1993, 501) notes, 
our “values and scruples” can affect our choices. Sen 
finds this inconsistent with rational choice theory, but 
Daniel Hausman (2007, 56–67) rightly disagrees. Either 
way, it is consistent with instrumental rationality.
This matters. Whether we talk of multiple ends, or 
present some ends as criteria/values, it shows that instru-
mental rationality need not be amoral. Instrumental ratio-
nality will thus only pick immoral ends if our ends permit 
that, as with unconstrained capitalists. Such actions are 
precluded where instrumental rationality is part of a more 
moral system.
Rawls’s insight about instrumental rationality’s essen-
tial contestability also applies here. Without criteria, we 
could almost never decide which means are better. 
Criteria are only irrelevant in incredibly rare situations—
perhaps nonexistent in practice—when there is only one 
goal, which can either be attained or not, with only one 
means of reaching it, and no knock-on consequences. 
Everywhere else, criteria apply.
These criteria need not be economistic ones like speed 
or cost. They could equally involve respecting property 
or the environment. Alas, adherents and critics of instru-
mental rationality often see criteria too narrowly. Tribe’s 
(1973, 618, 628–29) influential critique, for example, 
slips from instrumental rationality as choosing “effica-
cious” means, to criticizing cost–benefit analysis. Tribe 
is quite right that we should care about how we reach our 
ends (Tribe 1973, 629, 631–34), but criticizing instru-
mental rationality commits the poisoned carrots fallacy: 
the fundamental problem is placing instrumental rational-
ity in a narrow cost–benefit framework. Sen (2002, 314; 
see also 12, 159, 162, 181, 189–92), addressing social 
choice theory, finds “nothing peculiar” about considering 
the goodness of processes and outcomes together, as with 
politicians seeking to be reelected fairly. Exactly: fair-
ness is no less a potential criterion for instrumental 
rationality than speed or cost. As noted above, instru-
mental rationality is an essentially contestable concept, 
and different value-systems will impose different crite-
ria for what makes something a “good” means.
In short, whatever the textbook simplifications, our 
choices are almost always governed by multiple criteria: 
to relate means solely to one end is almost inconceivable 
in reality. Instrumental rationality requires “all things 
considered” judgments (Varoufakis 1998, 50, emphasis 
removed): we choose means which best achieve our ends 
when our ends are considered together (Gert 1998, 773). 
Some rational choice theorists may see this as involving 
whatever it takes to reach an end, but most of us should 
see it more broadly. This crucial reformulation of instru-
mental rationality is implicit in many accounts, including 
economists who discuss trade-offs between two criteria 
(e.g., speed and cost).
Conclusion
Critical theory has been hugely influential, for theorists 
and empiricists, offering profound insights and prescrip-
tions. But it is weakened by significant overstatements 
about instrumental rationality. Instrumental rationality is 
commonly defined too narrowly. Its alleged presupposi-
tions and effects are frequently exaggerated. The ensuing 
criticisms are too often fallacious, leading most critical 
theorists to oppose instrumental rationality despite its 
importance to them.
Rather than rejecting instrumental rationality, critical 
theorists should censure those who claim to uphold 
instrumental rationality but who actually support bad 
means to their ends, or ends which are means to bad ends. 
This line of criticism is much more incisive. “You claim 
to be instrumentally rational,” critical theorists can say. 
“But you are picking bad means to your ends, or your 
ends are means to things you dislike. So much for you 
being instrumentally rational!” Rather than attacking a 
caricature of instrumental rationality, critical theorists 
Blau 11
should attack faulty applications of the idea. They can 
make the same substantive points—more rigorously, 
albeit less rhetorically powerfully.
This is significant. Underlying these caricatures and 
criticisms of instrumental rationality are extremely 
important challenges to the narrow and skewed morality 
underpinning much of modernity. The fundamental issue 
is not rationality but morality. This reframing means 
critical theorists should censure not instrumental ratio-
nality itself but impoverished value-systems. Critical 
theorists can make much the same points, but far more 
strongly, because adherents of instrumental rationality 
cannot reject the critique as a caricature. Nor can they 
reject critical theorists’ arguments as self-defeating 
because critical theorists need instrumental rational-
ity—especially Habermasians, in discursive rationality 
and for implementing deliberative democracy.
Nonetheless, standard critical-theory objections to 
instrumental rationality do necessitate some revisions to 
orthodox understandings of instrumental rationality. 
Instrumental rationality’s adherents should be more 
explicit that instrumental rationality can apply to groups, 
need not assume self-interest, is consistent with emotion, 
may not involve fixed ends, and can help us question our 
ends. Instrumental rationality’s essential contestability is 
also a deep and potentially troubling insight. While 
deflecting some critical-theory objections, it raises prob-
lems for instrumental rationalists: “good” or “best” 
means to ends are not necessarily obvious or uncontest-
able, and the particular means often prioritized by econo-
mists can be questioned.
I will conclude with two methodological points. 
First, future critical-theory studies of instrumental ratio-
nality may require more empirical analysis. Empirical 
analysis adds little if instrumental rationality is bad by 
definition. But as instrumental rationality is not bad by 
definition, its consequences depend on the broader 
framework in which it operates, or how well it is applied. 
Empirical analysis casts light on when it is beneficial or 
dangerous (see too Blau 2011, 52–54). Combining nor-
mative and empirical analysis always mattered in criti-
cal theory, of course, but Adorno and Horkheimer’s 
empirical claims were cherry-picked to support their 
case; this empirical analysis was inadequate. Much 
recent critical-theory-inspired empirical work on delib-
erative democracy is evenhanded (e.g., Steiner et al. 
2004), and we need similar research on instrumental 
rationality more specifically.
Second, what are the implications of the fallacies dis-
cussed in the third and fourth sections of this paper? Such 
fallacious arguments are widespread—and are found far 
beyond critical theory. Countless people disparage or 
spurn poststructuralism because part of it is nonsense, for 
example, or reject quantitative social science because of 
some mindless number-crunching. Conflating a thing 
with some examples of the thing helps “motivated rea-
soning,” where we unconsciously accept inadequate evi-
dence that supports a conclusion we want to reach.
Critical theorists who attack instrumental rationality 
thus exemplify fallacious arguments that are actually 
extremely common. And these fallacies undermine critical 
theorists’ emancipatory goals. Of course, such intellectual 
constraints are nowhere near as important as the structural 
constraints that critical theorists primarily oppose. But 
they are constraints nonetheless. They stop us from freely 
and open-mindedly considering the strengths and weak-
nesses of things that may actually help us—like instru-
mental rationality.
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